Game Theory and the Law: Baird, Gertner and Picker
Table of Contents
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Introduction: Understanding Strategic Behavior
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1
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Chapter 1: Simultaneous Decisionmaking and the Normal Form
Game
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7
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- The Normal Form Game
- Using Different Games to
Compare Legal Regimes
- The Nash Equilibrium
- Civil Liability, Accident
Law, and Strategic Behavior
- Legal Rules and the Idea of
Strict Dominance
- Collective Action Problems
and the Two-by-Two Game
- The Problem of Multiple Nash
Equilibria
- The Limits of Models of
Simultaneous Decisionmaking
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 2: Dynamic Interaction and the Extensive Form Game
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56
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- The Extensive Form Game and
Backwards Induction
- A Dynamic Model of Preemption
and Strategic Commitment
- Subgame Perfection
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 3: Information Revelation, Disclosure Laws, and
Renegotiation
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88
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- Incorporating Beliefs into
the Solution Concept
- The Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium Solution Concept
- Verifiable Information,
Voluntary Disclosure, and the Unraveling Result
- Disclosure Laws and the
Limits of Unraveling
- Observable Information,
Norms, and the Problem of Renegotiation
- Optimal Incentives and the
Need for Renegotiation
- Limiting the Ability of
Parties to Renegotiate
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 4: Signaling, Screening, and Nonverifiable
Information
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137
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- Signaling and Screening
- Modeling Nonverifiable
Information
- Signals and the Effects of
Legal Rules
- Information Revelation and
Contract Default Rules
- Screening and the Role of
Legal Rules
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 5: Reputation and Repeated Games
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180
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- Backwards Induction and its
Limits
- Infinitely Repeated Games,
Tacit Collusion, and the Folk Theorem
- Reputation, Predation, and
Cooperation
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 6: Collective Action and the Limits of Simple
Models
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213
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- Collective Action and the
Role of Law
- Embedded Games
- Understanding the Structure
of Large Games
- Collective Action and Private
Information
- Collective Action Problems in
Sequential Decisionmaking
- Herd Behavior
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 7: Noncooperative Bargaining
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247
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- Modeling the Division of
Gains from Trade
- Legal Rules as Exit Options
- Bargaining and Corporate
Reorganizations
- Collective Bargaining and
Exit Options
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Chapter 8: Bargaining and Information
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275
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- Basic Models of the
Litigation Process
- Modeling Separate Trials for
Liability and Damages
- Information and Selection
Bias
- Discovery Rules and
Verifiable Information
- Summary
- Bibliographic Notes
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Conclusion: Information and the Limits of Law
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304
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Copyright © 1995-2000, Randal C. Picker