Game Theory and the Law: Baird, Gertner and Picker






Abreu, D., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti. (1986). Optimal Cartel Equilibria with Imperfect Monitoring. Journal of Economic Theory 39:251-269. Chapters 4 and 5.

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Ayres, I., and R. Gertner. (1992). Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules. Yale Law Journal 101:729-773. Chapters 3 and 4.

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Baird, D., and R. Picker. (1991). A Simple Noncooperative Bargaining Model of Corporate Reorganizations. The Journal of Legal Studies 20:311-349. Chapter 7.

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Bebchuk, L., and S. Shavell. (1991). Information and the Scope of Liability for Breach of Contract: The Rule of Hadley vs. Baxendale. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7:284-312. Chapter 4.

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Becker, G. (1993). Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Life. Journal of Political Economy 101:385-409. Chapter 5.

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Bergman, Y., and J. Callen. (1991). Opportunistic Underinvestment in Debt Renegotiations and Capital Structure. The Journal of Financial Economics 29:137-171. Chapter 7.

Bergstršm, C., P. Hšgfeldt, and K. Lithell. (1993). Restructuring of Financially Distressed Firms: The Role of Large Debtholders in Continental European and Scandanavian Financial Markets. Mimeo. Stockholm School of Economics. Chapter 7.

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Bolton, P., and J. Farrell. (1990). Decentralizaion, Duplication and Delay. Journal of Political Economy 98:803-826. Chapter 4.

Brilmayer, L. (1991). Conflict of Laws. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. Chapter 1.

Brown, J. (1973). Toward An Economic Theory of Liability. Journal of Legal Studies 2:323-349. Chapter 1.

Buchanan, J. (1989). The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State. In R. Tollison and V. Vanberg (eds.), Explorations into Constitutional Economics. College Station,TX: Texas A&M University Press. Chapter 1.

Calabresi, G. (1970). The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Chapter 1.

Calabresi, G. (1975). Optimal Deterrrence and Accidents. Yale Law Journal 84:656-671. Chapter 1.

Calabresi, G., and J. Hirschoff. (1972). Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts. Yale Law Journal 81:1055-1085. Chapter 1.

Carlton, D., and J. Klamer. (1983). The Need for Coordination Among Firms with Special Reference to Network Industries. University of Chicago Law Review 50:446-465. Chapter 6.

Carlton, D., and J. Perloff. (1990). Modern Industrial Organization. Glenview, IL: Scott Foresman/Little, Brown & Company. Chapter 5.

Chatterjee, K., and L. Samuelson. (1987). Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information: An Infinite Horizon Model with Alternating Offers. Review of Economic Studies 54:175-192. Chapter 6.

Chatterjee, K., and L. Samuelson. (1988). Bargaining Under Two-Sided Incomplete Information: The Unrestricted Offers Case. Operations Research 36:605-618. Chapter 6.

Chatterjee, K., and W. Samuelson. (1983). Bargaining Under Incomplete Information. Operations Research 31:835-851. Chapter 6.

Cho, I.-K., and D. Kreps. (1987). Signalling Games and Stable Equilibria. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102:179-221. Chapter 4.

Chung, T.-Y. (1992). Efficiency of Comparative Negligence: A Game Theoretic Analysis. Mimeo, University of Western Ontario. Chapter 1.

Clarke, E.H. (1971). "Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice, 11:17-31. Chapter 6.

Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4:386-405. Chapter 3.

Coase, R. (1960). The Problem of Social Cost. Journal of Law and Economics 3:1-44. Chapter 1.

Coase, R. (1972). Durability and Monopoly. Journal of Law and Economics 15:143-149. Chapter 7.

Coase, R. (1988). The Firm, the Market, and the Law. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Chapter 1.

Cooper, R., D. DeJong, R. Forsythe, and T. Ross. (1990). Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results. American Economic Review 80:218-233. Chapter 1.

Cooter, R. (1987). Why Litigants Disagree: A Comment on George Priest's 'Measuring Legal Change'. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3:227-241. Chapter 8.

Cooter, R., S. Marks, and R. Mnookin. (1982). Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior. Journal of Legal Studies 11:225-51.

Cooter, R., and T. Ulen. (1986). An Economic Case for Comparative Negligence. New York University Law Review 61:1067-1110. Chapter 1.

Crocker, K., and S. Masten. (1991). Pretia Ex Machina? Prices and Process in Long-Term Contracts. Journal of Law and Economics 34:69-99. Chapter 3.

Curran, C. (1992). The Spread of the Comparative Negligence Rule in the United States. International Review of Law & Economics 12:317-32. Chapter 1.

Daughety, A., and J. Reinganum. (1991). Endogenous Sequencing in Models of Settlement and Litigation. Unpublished manuscript, University of Iowa. Chapter 8.

Deaton, A., and J. Muellbauer. (1990) Economics and Consumer Behavior. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Dewatripont, M. (1988). Commitment Through Renegotiation-Proof Contracts with Third Parties. Review of Economic Studies 55:377-390. Chapter 3.

Diamond, P. (1974). Accident Law and Resource Allocation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 5:366-405. Chapter 1.

Dixit, A. (1979). A Model of Duopoly Suggesting a Theory of Entry Barriers. Bell Journal of Economics 10:20-32. Chapter 5.

Dixit, A. and B. Nalebuff (1991). Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life. New York: Norton. Introduction.

Dye, R. (1985). Costly Contract Contingencies. International Economic Review 26:233-250. Chapter 3.

Easterbrook, F. (1981). Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies. University of Chicago Law Review 48:263-337. Chapter 5.

Easterbrook, F. (1989). Comment: Discovery as Abuse. Boston University Law Review 69:635-648. Chapter 8.

Easterbrook, F. and D. Fischel. (1991). The Economic Structure of Corporate Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 3.

Eisenberg, T. (1990). Testing the Selection Effect: A New Theoretical Framework with Empirical Tests. Journal of Legal Studies 19:337-358. Chapter 8.

Ellickson, R. (1991). Order Without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1 and 5.

Elster, J. (1986). Rational Choice. New York: New York University Press. Chapter 1.

Elster, J. (1989). The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

Emons, W. (1993). The Provision of Environmental Protection Measures under Incomplete Information: An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design. Mimeo. UniversitŠt Bern. Chapter 6.

Epstein, R. (1989). Beyond Foreseeability: Consequential Damages in the Law of Contract. Journal of Legal Studies 18:105-138. Chapter 2.

Farrell, J. (1983). Communication in Games I: Mechanism Design Without a Mediator. M.I.T. Working Paper. Chapter 4.

Farrell, J. (1987). Information and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Economic Perspectives 1:113-129. Chapter 4.

Farrell, J. (1989). Standardization and Intellectual Property. Jurimetrics Journal 30:35-50. Chapter 6.

Farrell, J., and R. Gibbons. (1989). Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining. Journal of Economic Theory 48:221-237. Chapter 7.

Farrell, J., and E. Maskin. (1989). Renegotiation in Repeated Games. Games and Economic Behavior 1:327-360. Chapter 5.

Farrell, J., and G. Saloner. (1985). Standardization, Compatability, and Innovation. Rand Journal of Economics 16:70-83. Chapter 6.

Farrell, J., and G. Saloner. (1986). Installed Base and Compatability: Innovation, Product Preannouncements, and Predation. American Economic Review 76:940-955. Chapter 6.

Fernandez, R., and J. Glazer. (1991). Striking for a Bargain Between Two Completely Informed Agents. American Economic Review 81:240-252. Chapter 7.

Fishman, M., and K. Hagerty. (1990). The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure. Quarterly Journal of Economics 105:427-444. Chapter 3.

Friedman, D. (1989). An Economic Analysis of Alternative Damage Rules for Breach of Contract. The Journal of Law and Economics 32:281-310. Chapter 2.

Friedman, D. (1992). Deterring Imperfectly Informed Tortfeasors: Optimal Rules for Penalty and Liability. Mimeo. University of Chicago. Chapter 1.

Friedman, J. (1990). Game Theory with Applications to Economics. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd edition. Chapter 1.

Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. (1991a). Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 7.

Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. (1991b). Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 53:236-60. Chapter 3.

Geanakoplos, J. (1992). Common Knowledge. Journal of Economic Perspectives 6, no. 4: 53-82. Chapter 3.

Ghemawat, P. (1984). Capacity Expansion in the Titanium Dioxide Industry. Journal of Industrial Economics 33:145-163. Chapter 5.

Gibbons, R. (1988). Learning in Equilibrium Models of Arbitration. American Economic Review 78:896-912.

Gibbons, R. (1992). Game Theory for Applied Economists. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 3, and 4.

Goetz, C., and R. Scott. (1985). The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions between Express and Implied Contract Terms. California Law Review 73:261-322. Chapter 4.

Gordon, J. (1991). Shareholder Initiative: A Social Choice and Game Theoretic Approach to Corporate Law. University of Cincinnati Law Review 60:347-385. Chapter 1.

Gould, J. (1973). The Economics of Legal Conflicts. Journal of Legal Studies 2:279-300. Chapter 8.

Green, E., and R. Porter. (1984). Non-cooperative Collusion Under Imperfect Price Information. Econometrica 52:87-100. Chapter 5.

Grossman, S. (1981). The Informational Role of Warranties and Private Disclosure about Product Quality. Journal of Law and Economics 24:461-484. Chapter 3.

Grossman, S., and O. Hart. (1980). Disclosure Laws and Takeover Bids. Journal of Finance 35:323-334. Chapter 3.

Grossman, S., and O. Hart. (1986). The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration. Journal of Political Economy 94:691-719. Chapter 3.

Grossman, S., and M. Perry. (1986). Perfect Sequential Equilibrium. Journal of Economic Theory 39:97-119. Chapter 4.

Groves, T. (1973). Incentives in Teams, Econometrica, 41:617-31. Chapter 6.

Gul, F., and H. Sonnenschein (1988). On Delay in Bargaining with One-sided Uncertainty. Econometrica 56:601-11. Chapter 7.

Gul, F., H. Sonnenschein, R. Wilson (1986) Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture. Journal of Economic Theory 39:155-190. Chapter 7.

Hadfield, G. (1990). Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts. Stanford Law Review 42:927-992. Chapter 3.

Hammitt, J., S. Carroll, and D. Relles. (1985). Tort Standards and Jury Decisions. Journal of Legal Studies 14:751-762. Chapter 1.

Hampton, J. (1992). Expected Utility Theory. unpublished manuscript. Chapter 1.

Hardin, G. (1968). The Tragedy of the Commons. Science 162:1243-1248. Chapter 6.

Hardin, R. (1982). Collective Action. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Chapter 6.

Hart, O., and B. Holmstrom. (1987). The Theory of Contracts. In Truman Bewley (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 3.

Hart, O., and J. Moore. (1988). Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation. Econometrica 56:755-785. Chapter 3.

Hirshleifer, J. and J. Riley. (1992). The Analytics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 1.

Hughes, J., and E. Snyder. (1991). Litigation Under the English & American Rules: Theory & Evidence. unpublished manuscript, University of Michigan. Chapter 8.

Hylton, K. (1990). Costly Litigation and Legal Error under Negligence. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6:433-452. Chapter 1.

Hylton, K. (1992). Litigation Cost Allocation Rules and Compliance with the Negligence Standard. Mimeo. Northwestern School of Law. Chapter 1.

Jackson, T. (1982). Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the Creditors' Bargain. Yale Law Journal 91:857-907. Chapter 6.

Jackson, T. (1986). The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 6.

Johnston, J. (1990). Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules. Yale Law Journal 100:615-664. Chapter 4.

Joskow, P. (1985).Vertical Integration and Long-Term Contracts: The Case of Coal-burning Electric Generating Plants. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1:33-80. Chapter 3.

Jovanovic, B. (1982). Truthful Disclosure of Information. Bell Journal of Economics 13:36-44. Chapter 3.

Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. (1990). Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem. Journal of Political Economy 98:1325-1349. Chapter 1.

Kahneman, D., J. Knetsch, and R. Thaler. (1991). The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias: Anomalies. Journal of Economic Perspectives 5:193-206. Chapter 1.

Kaplow, L. (1992). Rules versus Standards: An Economic Analysis. Duke Law Journal 42:557-629. Chapter 4.

Katz, A. (1990a). The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement of Litigation. International Review of Law and Economics 10:3-27. Chapter 8.

Katz, A. (1990b). The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract Formation. Michigan Law Review 89:216-295. Chapter 1.

Katz, A. (1990c). Your Terms or Mine? The Duty to Read the Fine Print in Contracts. Rand Journal of Economics 21:518-537. Chapter 2.

Katz, M., and C. Shapiro. (1985). Network Externalities, Competition and Compatibility. American Economic Review 75:424-440. Chapter 6.

Katz, M., and C. Shapiro. (1986). Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities. Journal of Political Economy 94:822-841. Chapter 6.

Kennan, J., and R. Wilson. (1989). Strategic Bargaining Models and Interpretation of Strike Data. Journal of Applied Econometrics 4:S87-S130. Chapter 8.

Kennan, J., and R. Wilson. (1990). Can Strategic Bargaining Models Explain Collective Bargaining Data? AEA Papers and Proceedings 80:405-409. Chapter 7.

Klein, B., R. Crawford, and A. Alchian. (1978). Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the Competitive Contracting Process. Journal of Law and Economics 21:297-326. Chapter 3.

Kohlberg, E. (1990). Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas. In T. Ichiishi, A. Neyman, and Y. Tauman (eds.) Game Theory and Applications. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Chapter 6.

Kohlberg, E., and J.-F. Mertens. (1986). On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria. Econometrica 54:1003-1038. Chapter 4.

Kornhauser, L., and R. Revesz. (1991). Sequential Decisions by a Single Tortfeasor. Journal of Legal Studies 20:363-380. Chapter 1.

Kramer, L. (1990). Rethinking Choice of Law. Columbia Law Review 90:277-345. Chapter 1.

Kreps, D. (1988). Notes on the Theory of Choice. London: Westview Press. Chapter 1.

Kreps, D. (1990a). Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Chapters 1 and 2.

Kreps, D. (1990b). A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Chapters 1, 2, 3, and 7.

Kreps, D., and R. Wilson. (1982). Reputation and Imperfect Information. Journal of Economic Theory 27:253-279. Chapters 3, 5, and 6.

Kreps, D., P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson. (1982) Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma. Journal of Economic Theory 27:245-252. Chapters 1 and 5.

Kronman, A. (1978). Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts. Journal of Legal Studies 7:1-34. Chapter 4.

Kronman, A. (1985). Contract Law and the State of Nature. The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 1:5-32. Chapter 2.

Kydland, F. and Prescott, E. (1977). Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85:473-492. Chapter 2.

Laffont, J.J. (1988). Fundamentals of Public Economics, Cambridge: The MIT Press. Chapter 6.

Laffont, J.-J. (1990). The Economics of Uncertainty and Information. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. Chapter 3.

Laffont, J.J. and E. Maskin. (1982). "The Theory of Incentives: An Overview," chapter 2 in W. Hildenbrand, ed., Advances in Economic Theory, Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

Laffont, J.-J., and J. Tirole. (1991). Commitment and Renegotiation. Chapter 10 in, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation. M.I.T. Press. Chapter 3.

Landes, W. (1971). An Economic Analysis of the Courts. Journal of Law and Economics 14:61-107. Chapter 8.

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Landes, W., and R. Posner. (1980). Joint and Multiple Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis. Journal of Legal Studies 9:517-556. Chapter 1.

Landes, W., and R. Posner. (1981). The Positive Economic Theory of Tort Law. Georgia Law Review 15:851-924. Chapter 1.

Landes, W., and R. Posner. (1987). The Economic Structure of Tort Law. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 1.

Leebron, D. (1991). A Game Theoretic Approach to the Regulation of Foreign Direct Investment and the Multinational Corporation. University of Cincinnati Law Review 60:305-346. Chapter 1.

Leinfellner, W. (1986). The Prisoner's Dilemma and Its Evolutionary Iteration. A. Diekmann and P. Mitter (eds.), Paradoxical Effects of Social Behavior: Essays in Honor of Anatol Rapoport. Vienna: Physica. Chapter 1.

Loewenstein, G., S. Issacharoff, C. Camerer, and L. Babcock. (1993). Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining. Journal of Legal Studies.22:135-60. Chapter 8.

Matsui, A. (1991). Cheap Talk and Cooperation in a Society. Journal of Economic Theory 54:245-258. Chapter 7.

Maute, J. (1993). The Peevyhouse Case. Unpublished manuscript, The University of Oklahoma, Chapters 4 and 7.

McMillan, J. (1992). Games, Strategies, and Managers. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Chapter 7.

Menell, P., (1987). Tailoring Legal Protection for Computer Software. Stanford Law Review 39:1329-72. Chapter 6.

Menell, P., (1989). An Analysis of the Scope of Copyright Protection for Application Programs. Stanford Law Review 41:1045-1104. Chapter 6.

Milgrom, P. (1981). Good News and Bad News: Representation Theorems and Applications. Bell Journal of Economics 12:380-391. Chapter 3.

Milgrom, P., and J. Roberts. (1982). Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence. Journal of Economic Theory 27:280-312. Chapter 5.

Mnookin, R., and L. Kornhauser. (1979). Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: the Case of Divorce. Yale Law Journal 88:950-997. Chapters 1 and 2.

Mnookin, R. and Wilson, R. (1989). Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco, Virginia Law Review 75:295-334. Chapters 1 and 7.

Myerson, R. (1979). Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 47:61-73. Chapter 7.

Myerson, R. (1981). Optimal Auction Design. Mathematics of Operations Research 6:58-73. Chapter 7.

Myerson, R. (1991). Game Theory: Analysis of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapters 1 and 4.

Myerson, R., and M. Satterthwaite. (1983). Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading. Journal of Economic Theory 29:265-281. Chapter 8.

Nalebuff, B. (1987). Credible Pretrial Negotiation. Rand Journal of Economics 18:198-210. Chapter 8.

Nash, J. (1950a). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica 18:155-162. Chapter 1.

Nash, J. (1950b). Equilibrium Points in N-Person Games. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (U.S.A.) 36:48-49. Chapter 1.

Neale, M. and M. Bazerman. (1991). Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation. New York: The Free Press. Chapter 8.

Nozick, R. (1985). Newcomb's Problem and Two Principles of Choice. In Campbell, R. and L. Sowden (eds.), Paradoxes of Rationality and Cooperation: Prisoner's Dilemma and Newcomb's Problem. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. Chapter 1.

Okuno-Fujiwara, M., A. Postlewaite, and K. Suzumura. (1990). Strategic Information Revelation. Review of Economic Studies 57:25-47. Chapter 3.

Ordover, J. (1978). Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents. Journal of Legal Studies 7:243-262. Chapter 1.

Ordover, J. (1981). On the Consequences of Costly Litigation in the Model of Single Activity Accidents: Some New Results. Journal of Legal Studies 10:269-291. Chapter 1.

Ordover, J., and G. Saloner. (1989). Predation, Monopolization, and Antitrust. chapter 9 in, Schmalensee, R., and R. Willig (eds.). Handbook of Industrial Organization. volume 1, New York: North-Holland. Chapter 5.

Orr, D. (1991). The Superiority of Comparative Negligence: Another Vote. Journal of Legal Studies 20:119-129. Chapter 1.

Osborne, M., and A. Rubinstein. (1990). Bargaining and Markets. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Chapter 7.

Ostrom, E. (1990). Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chapter 6.

P'ng, I. (1983). Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial. Bell Journal of Economics 14:539-50. Chapter 8.

Palfrey, T., and H. Rosenthal. (1991). Testing for the Effects of Cheap Talk in a Public Goods Game with Private Information. Games and Economic Behavior 3:183-220. Chapter 7.

Pearce, D. (1988). Renegotiation-Proof Equilibria: Collective Rationality and Intertemporal Cooperation. unpublished manuscript, Yale University. Chapter 5.

Picker. R. (1992). Security Interests, Misbehavior, and Common Pools. The University of Chicago Law Review 59:645-679. Chapter 6.

Polinsky, M. (1987). Optimal Liability when the Injurer's Information about the Victim's Loss is Imperfect. The International Review of Law and Economics 7:139-147. Chapter 1.

Posner, R. (1973). An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration. Journal of Legal Studies 2:399-458. Chapter 8.

Posner, R. (1992). Economic Analysis of Law. 4th ed. Boston: Little, Brown. Chapters 1 and 6.

Poundstone, W. (1992). Prisoner's Dilemma. New York: Doubleday. Chapter 1.

Priest, G. (1985). Reexamining the Selection Hypothesis: Learning from Wittman's Mistakes. Journal of Legal Studies 14:215-243. Chapter 8.

Priest, G. (1987). Measuring Legal Change. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3:193-225. Chapter 8.

Priest, G., and B. Klein. (1984). The Selection of Disputes for Litigation. Journal of Legal Studies 13:1-55. Chapter 8.

Rabin, M. (1990). Communication between Rational Agents. Journal of Economic Theory 51:144-170. Chapter 7.

Raiffa, H. (1982). The Art and Science of Negotiation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Chapter 8.

Rasmusen, E. (1989). Games and Information: An Introduction to Game Theory. New York: Basil Blackwell. Chapter 1.

Rea, S. (1987). The Economics of Comparative Negligence. International Review of Law and Economics 7:149-162. Chapter 1.

Reinganum, J., and L. Wilde. (1986). Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs. Rand Journal of Economics 17:557-568. Chapter 8.

Roe, M. (1987). The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts. Yale L.J. 97:232-279. Chapter 6.

Rogerson, W. (1984). Efficient Reliance and Damage Measures for Breach of Contract. Bell Journal of Economics 15:39-53. Chapter 2.

Rotemberg, J., and G. Saloner. (1986). A Supergame-Theoretic Model of Price Wars During Booms. American Economic Review 76:390-407. Chapter 5.

Rothschild, M., and J. Stiglitz (1976). Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information. Quarterly Journal of Economics 90:629-650. Chapter 4.

Rubinfeld, D. (1987). The Efficiency of Comparative Negligence. Journal of Legal Studies 16:375-394. Chapter 1.

Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50:97-110. Chapter 7.

Rubinstein, A. (1985). A Bargaining Model with Incomplete Information about Time Preferences. Econometrica 53:1151-1172. Chapter 7.

Schelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univerity Press. Chapters 1 and 5.

Scherer, F., and D. Ross. (1990). Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance. 3rd edition. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Chapter 5.

Schmalensee, R., and R. Willig (eds.). (1989). Handbook of Industrial Organization. volumes 1 and 2. New York: North-Holland. Chapter 5.

Schwartz, A. (1992). Relational Contract in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies. Journal of Legal Studies 21:271-318. Chapter 3.

Schwartz, G. (1978). Contributory and Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal. The Yale Law Journal 87:697-727. Chapter 1.

Schweizer, U. (1989). Litigation and Settlement under Two-Sided Incomplete Information. Review of Economic Studies 56:163-177. Chapter 8.

Setear, J. (1989). The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse. Boston University Law Review 69:569-633. Chapter 8.

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Wittman, D. (1985). Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased? Journal of Legal Studies 14:185-214. Chapter 8.

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